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Abstract
:
In this paper we characterize the terms of secured loan contracts not
as directly specifying efficient allocations of assets, but as positioning
parties optimally for subsequent strategic renegotiation. We develop an
imperfect information model in which a secured loan contract with
renegotiation will achieve efficient outcomes while no other simple contract
can. We use our structure to analyze and compare the efficiency of
various rules for foreclosure of mortgages.
* Department of Economics, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and
Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University, respectively. We thank Robert
Marshall, David Sappington, and Helen Tauchen for their comments and
suggestions. This research was supported by NSF grant SES-8511137.

DEFAULT, FORECLOSURE, AND STRATEGIC RENEGOTIATION
Introduction
What determines the terras that parties include in a contract? At the
most fundamental level, a contract is a reassignment of property rights. If
parties voluntarily enter such a reassignment, it must be the case that the
reassignment is moving property towards the party who places the higher
value upon it. Thus if A contracts to sell B a car for $5000, A must value
the car at no more than $5000 and B must value it at no less than $5000.
Similarly, this view would explain all clauses of contracts reassigning
property rights on the basis of economic efficiency : If the contract states
that the purchaser of the house receives the window screens or the seller
of the appliance bears the risk of malfunction for thirty days, we would be
content to understand those clauses as part of an optimal reallocation.
To be sure, the economic claim is in fact only that rights will be used
by those with the highest valuation for them. A retailer contracts for
purchase of a load of clothing, not because his own valuation of the goods
is higher than the price, but because he anticipates the finding of further
purchasers for whom the value is high. Similarly, the typical purchaser of
a commodity futures contract does not anticipate using the commodity
himself.
Although the claim in strict form only predicts ultimate disposition of
property rights, we would still expect that there is a tendency in any
transaction for rights to move to their higher valued users. For in
general, establishing an exchange is a costly procedure. Bargaining is
time-consuming. The lawyers, secretaries, and other specialized staff
necessary to establish an agreement are costly. Should an agreement send
goods to the party placing a lower value on them, then further agreements
will be necessary to reallocate the goods correctly. The costs of
contracting are minimized by getting the allocation right in the first
place
.
On the other hand, when there is uncertainty there is an opposing
tendency not to get the agreement correct to begin with. In any complex
arrangement, many of the provisions will depend on contingencies which may
arise. Normally, the buyer of the house may wish to purchase the fixtures,
as well, but perhaps he unexpectedly finds himself in circumstances in which
he will find it necessary to carry out extensive interior alterations, so
that the current fixtures are suddenly of no use to him. Meanwhile, perhaps
the seller learns his new house lacks the fixtures or has a special
attachment to some of them. When decisions are interrelated in complex ways,
the correct ultimate allocation may include a complex set of contingencies.
Rather than getting these right initially, contracting parties will prefer
to wait until the uncertainty is resolved and only then establish the
specific bundle of rights to be transferred.
Thus the decision as to which clauses to incorporate in a contract at
any time will always involve the tradeoff between increased accuracy of the
array of contingent arrangements so not to have to rewrite the contract, and
increased simplicity, including only the terms for contingencies likely to
arise
.
According to this point of view, there remains a tendency for contracts
to assign property rights to those for whom the property has the highest
value -- only now the tendency becomes a probabilistic prediction. At any
round of contract formulation, the contract will tend to provide that assets
be assigned to the party who will most likely have the highest valuation for
them. If contingencies work out in their most likely resolutions, no
further reassignment is necessary. If surprises arise, so that the
allocation initially agreed upon is sub-optimal then renegotiation occurs.
This view of renegotiation -- as restoring the allocation of property
to its expected optimum in the event that surprises render previously
established allocations sub-optimal -- is that behind many descriptions of
contract formulation and renegotiation in economics. A typical example is
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the model of Dye , which posits a cost to the detail which is specified in a
contract, and then assumes that contracts are written so as not to cover
3
every detail. Many of the contracting models used in macroeconomics have
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behind them similar assumptions. Several models of renegotiation assume
the permitted contracts are in a limited set, and as the circumstances vary
the current contract becomes sufficiently suboptimal that a new choice
becomes necessary.
All of these structures thus yield the understanding that the terms of
a contract are specified to minimize future renegotiation. As a consequence,
these structures predict that the terms specified in the contract are the
terms most likely to be carried out in practice.
However, there are important situations which do not appear to conform
to this structure or this prediction. A common example of a clause which
does not conform is the provision of security for a loan.
When a bank makes a loan to a firm or home purchaser, the agreement
may stipulate that the asset purchased serve as security for the loan. In
other words, the bank stipulates that the asset can be seized should the
borrower not repay. It would be expected that banks are typically less
efficient as managers of assets than are the borrowers. And in fact, when
the borrower ends up short, loans are renegotiated. It is rare for the
threatened seizure of assets to take place. Why then go through the ritual
of including such a provision?
In this paper, we show that contract terms may have other purposes than
simply specifying efficient outcomes. Some clauses in a contract may be
designed to place one party or the other in a strong position in the event
of any renegotiation of the contract. We demonstrate that such
pre -positioning can serve a useful purpose. We develop an imperfect
information model in which a secured loan contract with renegotiation will
achieve efficient outcomes while no other simple contract can. We use our
structure to analyze and compare the efficiency of various rules for
foreclosure of mortgages.
In previous papers we explore this use of renegotiation for strategic
purposes , rather than as a remedy in the event of surprises . In those
papers, the distinction between the two explanations of renegotiation is
highlighted by examination of situations in which there is no uncertainty,
(and therefore no possibility of surprise). In this paper, uncertainty is
integral to the model we develop; thus the renegotiation we observe has both
strategic and surprise aspects to it.
A Model of Secured Loans
An entrepreneur has an idea for a project. The project may be initiated
at a cost of K dollars. This amount is greater than the entrepreneur's
resources. Therefore, a loan is necessary if the project is to' be realized.
(For simplicity, we treat the entrepreneur as having no resources of his
own)
.
The project's value is
w x y (a + 1)
where the parameters are interpreted as follows:
The variable w is a pre- investment signal of the quality of the
project. It is observed only by the entrepreneur and his bank. If (and only
if) it is high enough, the project is worth undertaking. We study the
contractual arrangement between the bank and the entrepreneur assuming that
w is sufficient for the investment to be desirable. By assuming w is known
only to the bank and the entrepreneur, we model a situation in which the two
parties enjoy a special relation, and the entrepreneur cannot replace his
current lender by another. Given this justification of the special
relation, the specific value of w is inessential. Therefore, in the sequel
we assume that w =- 1 and that this value is sufficiently high to justify the
exclusive relation between the bank and the entrepreneur and do not consider
w further.
Once the investment is made, y is realized and becomes known to the
entrepreneur and to the bank. Thus we can regard y as a post- investment
signal of the profitibility of the project. Let the distribution of y be
denoted F(y) ; F(y) = for y < 0.
The variable a is an effort level which is subsequently chosen by the
entrepreneur. For concreteness , we suppose the variable takes on only one
of two values: (0 1). Positive effort costs the entrepreneur an amount C.
The choice of ownership is denoted by x : x = 2 if the entrepreneur owns
the project, and it is 1 otherwise.
"Ownership" deserves an explanation. In general we expect the rights
to goods to be held by those who value them most. It is easy to imagine in
some cases that the same good could yield different values depending on who
holds it. Housing services are a natural example; one way of modeling the
situation is to describe the output (housing services) as a joint product of
the physical asset (housing) and particular capacities embodied in the
person dwelling in the house -- so that the housing yields greater services
when combined with one dweller than with another.
Similar effects can be had in the case of entrepreneurial investments:
The outcome of the project may depend on the physical investments and the
skills of the entrepreneur in charge. For example, whoever is in possession
of the asset may thereby be privy to information possessed by no one else.
The entrepreneur uses such information to enhance the value of the asset.
Different people have different abilities, and, in the situation we are
modeling, we assume the original entrepreneur has more ability than anybody
else. That the project is worth more if the entrepreneur owns it implies
that on efficiency grounds alone, ownership should rest with the
6
entrepreneur
.
There is a second, natural aspect to ownership of an investment
project: The owner is the residual claimant of any values associated with
the project.
We assume that the entrepreneur and the lender are both risk neutral.
The bank borrows or lends money at the risk free market rate of interest.
Therefore whenever we describe the costs or benefits to the bank of future
receipts or disbursements of money, we automatically translate these streams
of payment into their present discounted values. The entrepreneur has
limited access to the capital market. That is to say, he can lend to third
parties at the risk free rate, but if he borrows on the outside market, he
will pay a premium over the amounts the bank pays to get funds from other
sources. (We could in turn justify this imperfection in the capital market
on further informational grounds, but we do not pursue this possibility
here)
.
This difference in ability to borrow or lend on capital markets
implies that there are gains to be had by the two parties entering into some
agreement. Equivalent results could be generated by using a model with risk
aversion, and positing different degrees of risk aversion for entrepreneur
and bank. Another possibility would be to start by incorporating limited
liability into the analysis; the resultant behavior would be similar to that
induced by differences in abilities to borrow. However, we have preferred
to avoid begining with an appeal to limited liability. Otherwise we would
have to address the question of whether the need to incorporate
renegotiation into contracts stemmed from the existence of limited liability
itself. By using this formulation we show that it does not.
As we have noted, the values of the signals w and y, and the effort
level are not known by any third parties. The only variables observable by
third parties are the ownership of the asset, and any payments made.
It is useful to begin analysis of this problem by examining the
efficient allocation in the case of full information. The efficient
allocation is characterized by the following considerations:
1. The ownership of the asset should always be vested in the
entrepreneur
.
2. The entrepreneur should invest effort in the production process
whenever
w • 2 • 2 • y - C > w • 2 - 1 • y
That is, whenever
y > c/(2w)
3. Payments made by the entrepreneur to the bank should never be
greater than
w 2 a y - C a
which is the net benefit of the project in a realization.
4. Finally, the project should be undertaken at all if and only if the
expectation of the net benefit of the project is greater than K:
J max (2wy , 4wy - C) dF(y) > K
Contracts
Next we consider various contracts which could be offered in this
environment. Recall that contracts cannot directly depend on realizations of
y , w or a.
The simplest contract merely specifies who owns the project and what
monetary payment, if any, is to be made. The next simplest contract is one
which gives one party the option to transfer the ownership to the other for
a specified price. Such contracts can take many forms, but one commonly
used regards the good as security for the loan: At his option, the borrower
either pays the specified repayment of the loan, or gives up the security to
the lender. We will concentrate on this form of the contract. We will
examine the security contract which gives zero expected profits to the
lender. (To justify concentrating on the zero profits contract, assume that
at the outset there are a large number of banks each potentially possessing
the ability to enter the special relationship with the entrepreneur, and
therefore competing away their expected profits from the arrangement.)
To evaluate contracts in the presence of possible renegotiation
requires a theory of the outcomes of negotiations. We assume that
negotiations work as follows: If parties are already committed to an outcome
which is Pareto efficient, then there is no further negotiation. If,
however, previously signed contracts commit the parties to an inefficent
outcome, such that both sides could gain from a renegotiation then
negotiation will occur. We assume that the outcome that the parties move to
as a result of the renegotiation is an efficient outcome in which the gains
from the move are split evenly. Given the risk neutrality of both parties,
this assumption implies the choice of the Nash bargaining solution.
In the case of a contract in which one party has the right to exercise
an option, renegotiation works as follows: If the party owning the option
prefers the alternative which is Pareto optimal, no renegotiation occurs,
and the party carries out his preferred alternative. Suppose on the other
hand that the party owning the option personally prefers the alternative
which is Pareto inferior -- that is, the other party would be willing to
offer a side payment large enough to induce the party owning the option to
switch away from his prefered alternative. In this case renegotiation will
occur. The assumption of equal division of the gains determines the size of
the resultant side payment
.
We consider the following secured loan arrangement: The entrepreneur
agrees to repay T to the lender. If the entrepreneur fails to repay, then
the lender receives the assets in the project.
How does such an agreement work in the presence of renegotiation?
Consider the point at which the entrepreneur has the option of handing over
the asset or of paying up. If the value of the asset to the entrepreneur is
greater than T, he prefers to pay and retain the asset. If the value of the
asset is less than T, he prefers to threaten to hand over the asset to the
bank. Given this threat, which is credible unless the contract is
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renegotiated, the bank prefers to renegotiate the initial loan.
The value to the bank of the unrenegotiated loan is
w y (a+1)
The value to the entrepreneur of the unrenegotiated loan is
aC
The social value of leaving the asset in the entrepreneur's hands is
2 w y (a+1) - aC.
According to our bargaining theory, each party will receive half of the
difference ; thus the payment by the entrepreneur to the bank is
1.5 * w y (a+1)
The net benefit to the entrepreneur is
max (.5 w y (a+1) - aC , 2 w y (a+1) - aC - T)
and the net benefit to the bank is
min (1.5 * w y (a+1) , T)
Next we consider the decisions the entrepreneur will make regarding the
effort he will expend under a secured loan contract, given his awareness of
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the outcomes of the subsequent bargaining as described above. The
entrepreneur prefers the to choose a - 1 if and only if y is above
some critical level. He chooses a to solve the following problem:
max( max {(.5 w y (a-:-l) - aC) , ( 2 w y (a+1) - aC - T) }
)
a
Straightforward calculation demonstrates that it is optimal to set a equal
to zero if
( 1 . 5 wy > T and 2 wy > 4 wy - C )
or if
(1.5 wy < T < 3 wy and . 5 wy > 4wy - T - C )
or if
(3 wy < T and . 5 wy > 2 wy - C )
Otherwise, it is optimal to set a equal to one.
Thus if
.75 C > T, (1)
a is chosen efficiently.
Provided (1) holds, T is defined by the requirement that the lender
make zero expected profits. In other words,
12
J min (1.5 w y , T) dF(y) - K
(This simplified version of the profits formula is valid because when
(1) holds, the entrepreneur chooses a equal to zero whenever T exceeds the
project's value.) Note that T is therefore greater than K, the difference
representing the default premium. Thus provided
J* min (1.5 w y, .75 C) dF(y) > K
the efficient solution is generated by this security contract. It can be
verified that in these cases the value of the project does indeed exceed the
cost of it.
Next we consider alternative simple contracts and demonstrate that none
of these alternatives would be successful.
1. The simplest contract to consider would be one which requires the debtor
unconditonally to pay the creditor an amount K. In effect we could describe
such a contract as holding the debtor personally liable for the debt. In
this context, we could interpret such liability as court-enforced repayment
even in circumstances where the debtor must obtain fundsbeyond those
generated by the project. (Imagine for example, a garnishment of wages in
another job). In fact such a requirement would be complicated by the costs
of enforcing the contract if the debtor attempts to default. We will
consider the complications of court costs below, but for now, note that even
if the enforcement costs were zero, this contract would not be as desirable
as the security contract, for it would inefficiently allocate the risk of
repayment. Note the following, related, undesirable effect of such a
contract: it would, for certain values of y, cause over- investment in
effort as the debtor attempts to avoid being required to obtain outside
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funds to repay his debts.
2. A second possibility would be for the bank to own the project and, at
its discretion hand it over to the entrepreneur for a consideration. This
will also be inefficient relative to the security contract: Since the bank
will share in the gains made as a result of the investment by the
entrepreneur, the entrepreneur will tend to underinvest in effort.
3. In a world in which renegotiation were not permitted, no simple contract
would be efficient. If the contract specified that in some circumstances the
asset were to end up in the wrong hands, it would be inefficient. But the
only alternative for an unrenegotiated contract is one in which the asset
remains in the same hands in all realizations. If this is the case, the only
incentive compatible contract is one in which the payment does not vary with
the realization of y.
In summary: We have established a simple economic structure in which a
security contract with renegotiation dominates any other simple contract.
The security contract allows the payment from the entrepreneur to the bank
to be in effect contingent on the realization of the outcome of the project,
even though this amount is not stated in the contract and cannot be stated
effectively since it is not observable to any third party.
This observation by itself would be enough to make renegotiation a
useful tool in a contract, but without the further consideration that the
asset has different values in different hands, it would not be the case that
it mattered in the contract who had initial control over the asset.
Because the owner gets residual claims to the benefits of the asset, we
want the ownership of the asset to be in the hands of the entrepreneur in
any state in which it is worthwhile for him to make additional effort
investments. On the other hand, we want the asset in the hands of the bank
in states (low productivity states) in which this is not a consideration,
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in order to enable the bank to obtain some value from the project through
bargaining in those states. We do not want the bank to have the right to
personal liability of the entrepreneur for the debt, since that would
eliminate the proper risk sharing in the agreement.
Rules for Enforcement and Costs of Enforcement
Thus far we have made extremely simple assumptions about the
enforcement of the right of the lender to take over the asset in the case of
default. Effectively we have assumed that in the event of a default, the
banker can appropriate the project costlessly and at his own discretion. It
is this threat which gives him residual bargaining power in the
renegotiation.
This procedure comes closest to describing the most primitive version
of foreclosure, namely strict foreclosure . In the U.S., strict foreclosure
remains permissible in only a handful of states. In most states it has been
supplanted by judicial foreclosure . Under judicial foreclosure, the assets
of the defaulting borrower are taken over and sold by the court. If their
value exceeds the amount of the debt, the balance is given to the debtor.
If their value is less than the amount of the debt, then a deficiency
judgement is rendered against the debtor for the balance. The court's
actions provide procedural safeguards for the debtor, and is generally more
9
costly than would be the direct takeover of the assets by the creditor.
In response to the rise in judicial foreclosure, parties to contracts
resorted to including terras for foreclosure as part of their contracts. In
some respects, this non- judicial foreclosure is a return to the older terms
of strict foreclosure.
In this section we will compare the effectiveness of strict and
15
judicial foreclosure in determining whether secured loan contracts can lead
to efficient outcomes. To the model of the previous section we add one
simple assumption: the costs of a court-administered foreclosure are a
constant p.
Case I : Court Protection of Debtors
Imagine that the court enforces a rule that the lender can recover an
amount no greater than the face value of the debt (plus court costs) ; any
excess value will be returned to the borrower. (This rule is often enforced
by the court holding an public auction of the property.) How will such a
rule affect the efficiency of secured loans?
So long as the value of the asset to the entrepreneur is greater than
the value to any third party buyer, the value of the asset when sold will
never exceed the value to the entrepreneur. Thus the main effect of the new
rule arises through the imposition of extra court costs. In the case of
default, the new rule implies that the bank will receive a reduced value
from the assets:
wy(a + 1) - p
The net social gain from avoiding a default and leaving the asset in the
entrepreneur's hands is therefore
wy(a + 1) + p
-- that is to say, the avoidance of court costs becomes an extra gain in
renegotiating away from default. The gain is split evenly between the
parties, so that the entrepreneur now receives
16
max (.5 wy (a + 1) + .5 p - aC , 2wy (a + 1) - aC - T) (2)
and the bank receives
min { 1.5 wy (a + 1) • .5 p , T }
How does this change affect the entrepreneur's incentives to invest?
The entrepreneur picks a to maximize (2) ; calculations analogous to those in
the previous section show that the entrepreneur will pick the efficient
level of effort provided
.75 C > T + .5 p
(To see this, note that the entrepreneur's objective function is the same as
the objective function in the previous section, with T + . 5p substituted for
T. Furthermore, the efficient choice of a is independent of the cost p,
provided that renegotiation will allow the avoidance of court appearances).
The zero-profits level of T is defined by the expression
J" rain { 1.5 wy - .5 p, T } dF(y) = K
so that efficient outcomes are achievable with the secured loan contract,
provided that
/ rain (1.5 wy, .75C) dF(y) > K + .5 p
Note therefore that the presence of court costs decreases the
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likelihood of achieving the efficient outcome with a secured loan contract,
even though the court is never actually used -- that is to say, even
though in practice the parties always renegotiate rather than submit to
judicial foreclosure. The reason that the court costs become important is
that they impose an extra burden on the lender, reducing his power in any
renegotiation away from an inefficient outcome.
Case II: Court Protection of Creditors
Now imagine that the court enforces deficiency judgements: if the
value of the asset falls short of the debt, the court will assess the debtor
for the balance. Unlike the previous case, deficiency judgements destroy
the usefulness of the secured loan contract entirely -- even if the debtor
is not assessed court costs.
To see this, consider the debtor's choices of whether or not to
default in a regime with deficiency judgements. If the debtor wishes to
avoid foreclosure and the asset is not worth the value of the indebtedness,
then the debtor will have to obtain costly funds. However, if the debtor
does default, since the asset is worth less on the open market than it is to
the debtor, the debtor will be forced to obtain even a greater amount of
costly funds. Thus the debtor never threatens bankruptcy and contracts are
never renegotiated. In effect, a regime with deficiency judgements is
equivalent to a regime in which renegotiation is prohibited.
Remaining Issues : Non-Judicial Foreclosure
Given the restrictions inherent in the process of judicial foreclosure,
it is not surprising that the procedure has in fact largely been supplanted
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by non- judicial foreclosure, that is, the inclusion of terms in the loan
contract specifying the circumstances and procedures by which the lender
will obtain assets from the borrower in the event of default. Non- judicial
foreclosure is in effect a form of liquidated damages, a statement by the
parties as to the remedies to be applied in the event of breach of the
contract. Although it is not surprising that non- judicial foreclosure would
dominate a court-mandated foreclosure procedure, it is perhaps surprising to
learn which of the aspects of judicial foreclosure are the most
disadvantageous. Our preceding analysis indicates that it is the use of
deficiency judgements even more than the costliness of the litigation itself
which leads to the avoidance of judicial foreclosure.
If this conclusion is correct, it implies two interesting classes of
predictions. The first involves the terms of observed contracts. Our
description of secured loan contracts predicts a tendency for such
contracts to specify that in the event of default, the debtor's liability
will be limited to the surrender of the secured property.
The second class of predictions involves legislative responses to and
interpretations of secured loan contracts. In particular several states
have instituted various forms of legislation to limit deficiency
12judgements. While these actions can be understood simply as sympathetic
responses to debtors' plights, our analysis shows that they can also be
interpreted as guaranteeing that mortgages act as limited liability
instruments, and thereby guarantee that this form of secured loan yield the
advantages we have described in this paper.
Finally, this analysis is of relevance to the question of revision of
contractual duty in contract law. When a lender agrees to a reduction in
the payment required, in what sense is this renegotiated agreement an
enforceable contract? Can the lender subsequently demand the original
19
amounts based on the pre-existing duty rule? In the case of "matured and
liquidated" money debts, courts have had to find a modification of the terms
of the payment - - even in the most minute detail of location of payment or
person to be paid -- to serve as the consideration for the revised
13
contract. In the absence of strategic considerations, there would be no
economic justification for allowing the revision of a liquidated money debt:
one party's loss would be the other's gain, and the foreknowledge of the
possibility of being held up would reduce the parties' willingness to enter
14
into contracts. Our analysis shows that revisions of money debts can serve
a socially useful purpose. It also suggests that in the case of secured
loans we should treat the borrower's decision to forego default as the
consideration in the revised contract.
20
NOTES
A. Krorunan and R. Posner, The Economics of Contract Law 1-2 (1979).
2
Dye, "Costly Contract Contingencies," 26 International Economic Review
233-250 (1985). For other models incorporating renegotiation for remedying
incompleteness of contracts, see Shavell, "The Design of Contracts and
Remedies for Breach" 99 Quarterly Journal of Economics
.
121-148 (1984) and
Rogerson, "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contracts "
15 Rand Journal of Economics. 39-53 (1984).
3
Gray, "Wage Indexation: A Macroeconmic Approach" Journal of Monetary
Economics
.
221-236 (1976) and Taylor "Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered
Contracts" 8JL_ Journal of Political Economy 1-23, (1980).
4
Dye, "Optimal Length of Labor Contracts," 26 . International Economic
Review. 251-270 (1985), Harris, and Holmstrom "On the Duration of
Agreements," 2_8 International Economic Review. 389-406, (1987). See also
Gray, "On Indexation and Contract Length," 8_6 Journal of Political Economy
1-18 (1978).
Huberman and Kahn, "Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic
Renegotiation," 7_8 American Economic Review 471-484 (1988) and Huberman and
Kahn "Strategic Renegotiation and Contactual Simplicity" unpublished
Hoover Institution Working Paper in Economics E-87-31, Stanford University
July 1987.
21
The separation between ownership and control has always been a puzzle for
economics. Recently the theoretical literature has re-examined situations
in which the value of assets depends on who controls decisions about their
use. For papers in this vein see Hart and Moore "Incomplete contracts and
Renegotiation" 56 Econometrica. 755-786, (1988); Aghion and Bolton "An
'Incomplete Contract' Approach to Bankruptcy and the Financial Structure of
the firm " MIT Department of Economics unpublished working paper March 1988
no 484; Grossman and Hart. "The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of
vertical and lateral integration" 94 Journal of Political Economy 691-719
(1986)
The literature on bargaining and predicted outcomes of bargaining is
voluminous. An important non-cooperative model is Rubinstein
50. Econometrica "Perfect Equilibrium In a Bargaining Model" 97-110 (1982) .
For cooperative game theoretic approaches, of which equal division and Nash
bargaining solutions are notable see Luce R. and Raiffa H. Games and
Decisions : Introduction and Critical Survey New York John Wiley 1958.
This is a specific example of the "holdup problem." For the development of
firms as a response to the holdup problem, see 0. Williamson The Economic
Institutions of Capitalism (1985), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian "Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process" 21
Journal of Law and Economics 297-326 (1978) .
9
Goldstein, Real Property 443 (1984)
22
This result is complicated by the fact that deficiency judgements
themselves may not always be effective. Despite receiving the judgement,
the creditor may not collect if, for example, the debtor declares bankruptcy
or skips town. If the creditor predicts that a deficiency judgement will
not actually result in any payment, then the problem reduces to that of the
previous section. To the extent that deficiency judgements are successful,
they neutralize the value of foreclosure as an element in strategic
renegotiation.
There is a major limitation to the applicability of this prediction:
namely that in the case of multiple lenders to a single firm, secured loans
will be used to make favored lenders more senior in the event of bankruptcy.
The interpretation of secured loans in such circumstances requires a much
more complex analysis. Investigations making the competition among
creditors the center of the analysis of bankruptcy are Jackson, "Translating
Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum," 14 Journal of Legal
Studies. 73-113 (1985); Baird, "The Uneasy Case for Corporate
Reorganizations," 15 Journal of Legal Studies 127-147,(1986). A formal
economic analysis explicitly based on the inability of certain classes of
creditors to renegotiate (because of the transactions costs involved in
getting together) is White "Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and
other Priority rules" Bell Journal of Economics 550 (1980) .
23
12Goldstein, 444-445. outlines some of the responses. Some states, for
example California, have instituted legislation prohibiting deficiency
judgements outright in certain circumstances, and limiting the sums
obtainable in other circumstances. Since this rule could be evaded by a
mortgagee who took action first against the mortgagor personally and only
subsequently against the property for the balance of the amount due, some
states have enacted "one-action" rules, which require the mortagee to
proceed against the property first, effectively limiting him to only one
remedy.
13
Dawson, Harvey and Henderson Contracts : Cases and Comments Fourth Edition
523 (1982).
14
Dawson 537. suggests that even "unforeseen circumstances" does not serve
as a solid theoretical justification for making exceptions to the rule of
pre-existing duty.
24





HECKMAN
BINDERY INC.
JUN95
„ a t v\„J> N. MANCHESTERBound -To-Pleas^
,ND |ANA 46962

